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RESPONSE 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE HEALTH CARE 
MANDATE:  BASED IN POLITICS, NOT LAW 
DAVID ORENTLICHER†
 
 
In response to Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care 
Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1825 (2011). 
 
While critics of the individual mandate to purchase health care 
coverage have mounted a vigorous attack on its constitutionality, Pro-
fessor Mark Hall skillfully dismantles their claims.1  Mandate oppo-
nents have erected a Potemkin village of logic that has a facade of 
credibility but ultimately is deeply flawed.  As Professor Hall observes, 
one might reject the mandate on the basis of plausible readings of the 
constitutional text or in terms of nineteenth-century and early twen-
tieth-century Supreme Court opinions.  However, critics cannot 
square their view with the Court’s understanding of constitutional 
doctrine and theory over the past seventy years.2
 
†
Samuel R. Rosen Professor and Co-Director of the Hall Center for Law and 
Health, Indiana University School of Law—Indianapolis; M.D., Harvard Medical 
School; J.D., Harvard Law School. 
 
1
Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 
1825 (2011). 
2
To be sure, individual members of the Supreme Court may share the perspective 
of mandate critics.  Justice Clarence Thomas, for example, would like to resurrect 
Commerce Clause doctrine that was abandoned seventy years ago.  See United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (proposing that the Court 
“ought to temper [its] Commerce Clause jurisprudence”).  Indeed, there are minority 
viewpoints on most of the Court’s constitutional positions.  However, I agree with Pro-
fessor Hall’s view that prevailing interpretations of the Constitution readily justify the 
individual mandate. 
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In this Response, I will highlight important points in Professor 
Hall’s analysis and extend his argument with additional considera-
tions.  For example, the individual mandate should be upheld not on-
ly on the basis of the Commerce Clause power, as Professor Hall ar-
gues, but also on the basis of the taxing power. 
If the constitutional arguments against the mandate are weak, then 
how can we explain the unexpectedly high level of uncertainty about the 
mandate’s validity?  The answer to this question lies in politics, not law. 
I.  THE HIGHLIGHTS FROM PROFESSOR HALL’S ANALYSIS 
A.  Context Matters 
In their arguments against the individual mandate, critics neglect 
the fact that context matters in constitutional analysis.  As Professor 
Hall points out, opponents challenge the mandate as if it were a free-
standing provision rather than a key element of a broad regulatory 
overhaul of the health care system.3  Yes, it would be troublesome if 
Congress had passed a one-section law that made it a crime not to 
purchase health care insurance.  But that is not what happened.  Ra-
ther, Congress passed a more than 2400-page statute with hundreds of 
provisions designed to reduce the number of uninsured Americans, to 
lower the cost of medical treatment, and to improve the quality of 
care.4  In one important part of its effort to make insurance more af-
fordable, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) 
forbids insurers from charging people higher premiums or denying 
coverage on the basis of their cancer, heart disease, or other “preexist-
ing medical conditions.”5
 
3
See Hall, supra note 1, at 1829-30 (comparing this argument to criticism of feder-
al drug laws prior to the Court’s decision in Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), in 
which “challengers sought ‘to excise individual applications of a concededly valid sta-
tutory scheme’” (quoting Raich, 545 U.S. at 22)). 
  And as Congress recognized, this ban on 
health status discrimination can work only if people are required to 
4
Different printings of the bill take up different numbers of pages.  For the 2409-
page version, see H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (as passed by the House, Dec. 24, 2009), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr3590pp/pdf/BILLS-111hr 
3590pp.pdf.  Although 2400 is the number commonly used to refer to the law’s page 
length, a later version of the bill was only 955 pages.  See OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE 
COUNSEL, COMPILATION OF PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2010), 
available at http://docs.house.gov/energycommerce/ppacacon.pdf. 
5
In this way, the law supplements the civil rights statutes that ban discrimination 
by insurers on the basis of race or sex.  Starting in 2014, insurers may no longer dis-
criminate on the basis of health status.  PPACA § 1201, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-4 (West 
Supp. 1A 2010). 
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buy insurance.  Otherwise, people could game the system by waiting 
until they become sick before purchasing coverage.6  The connection 
between the antidiscrimination provision and the individual mandate 
is critical for constitutional purposes.  The Supreme Court has long 
recognized that when Congress enacts a broad regulatory statute, it 
may include provisions essential to the implementation of the statute 
even though the provisions might not be acceptable when standing 
alone.7  Thus, Congress can prohibit the backyard cultivation of mari-
juana for personal medicinal use as part of its broad effort to elimi-
nate the distribution of marijuana for recreational drug use.8  Similar-
ly, Congress can require the purchase of insurance as part of its broad 
effort to make health care coverage affordable.9
The commonly used broccoli hypothetical illustrates nicely the 
distinction between a stand-alone provision and a provision that sup-
ports a broader legislative objective.  Critics of the individual mandate 
argue that if Congress can require people to buy insurance to benefit 
their health, then it also can require people to buy—or even to eat—
broccoli to benefit their health.
 
10
 
6
State efforts to ban preexisting-conditions clauses without a mandate to purchase 
insurance have not worked.  See Mark A. Hall, The Factual Bases for Constitutional Challenges 
to Federal Health Insurance Reform, 38 N. KY. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 11-
22), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1717781 (“Previously, when states tried to elim-
inate medical underwriting without an insurance mandate, as Kentucky did in 1994, 
these markets suffered, shrank, and almost collapsed.” (footnote omitted)). 
  The critics are correct that a simple 
mandate to buy or eat broccoli would be unconstitutional.  However, 
suppose that the United States faced an outbreak of a new influenza 
7
See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-2388, 2011 WL 2556039, at *9 (6th 
Cir. June 29, 2011) (discussing cases from 1942 and 2005 in which the Court upheld 
provisions because they were part of a broad regulation of interstate commerce). 
8
According to the Court, the federal government is entitled to worry that mariju-
ana grown for personal medical purposes might be diverted into the illicit drug distri-
bution chain.  See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005) (“The . . . concern making it 
appropriate to include marijuana grown for home consumption in the [Controlled 
Substances Act] is the likelihood that the high demand in the interstate market will 
draw such marijuana into that market.”). 
9
See Thomas More Law Ctr., 2011 WL 2556039, at *12 (concluding that the individ-
ual mandate is an essential part of a broader regulatory scheme).  But see Florida v. U.S. 
Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Nos. 11-11021, 11-11067, 2011 WL 3519178, at *64 
(11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2011) (“Congress’s statutory reforms of health insurance prod-
ucts—such as guaranteed issue and community rating—do not reference or make their 
implementation in any way dependent on the individual mandate.”). 
10
See, e.g., Florida v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., No. 10-00091, 2011 WL 
285683, at *24 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011); Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate Before 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 27 (2011) [hereinafter Constitutionality of the In-
dividual Mandate] (statement of Randy E. Barnett, Professor, Georgetown University 
Law Center). 
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virus that was easily transmitted from one person to another and that 
was highly lethal.  Suppose further that broccoli contained a natural vac-
cine for the new virus.  In that situation, Congress could require people 
to eat broccoli.11
To put it another way, the legislative powers include the power to 
“make all laws . . . necessary and proper for carrying into execution” 
any enumerated power of Congress.
  When it comes to interpreting the power of the federal 
government, context really matters. 
12  The Commerce Clause power 
allows Congress to prohibit insurers from discriminating on the basis 
of an applicant’s health status, and the Necessary and Proper Clause 
allows Congress to impose an individual mandate to make the antidi-
scrimination ban work.13
B.  Activity Versus Inactivity:  A Distinction in Search of a Theory 
 
Critics emphasize another argument against the individual 
mandate.  They claim that Commerce Clause doctrine includes an im-
portant distinction between the regulation of activity and the regulation 
of inactivity.14
The critics are correct that the Constitution imposes real limits on 
the national government’s powers.  State governments may enjoy ple-
nary powers to protect the public welfare, but the national govern-
  In this view, Congress can shape economic transactions 
once they are undertaken, but Congress cannot require people to un-
dertake economic transactions in the first place.  Otherwise, there 
would be no meaningful limits to the Commerce Clause power. 
 
11
Under its Commerce Clause power, Congress may pass laws to protect persons 
traveling in interstate commerce.  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).  
Therefore, the broccoli mandate could be justified as a way of preventing interstate 
travelers from infecting one another with the virus. 
12
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18. 
13
Hall, supra note 1, at 1841 (“[I]t appears inescapable that compulsory insurance 
is necessary and proper in the particular context of PPACA to achieve Congress’s regu-
latory goal of requiring health insurers to accept all applicants regardless of health 
condition.”); see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 5 (invoking the Commerce Clause and the Ne-
cessary and Proper Clause to justify federal regulation of the local cultivation and use 
of marijuana for medicinal purposes); id. at 34-35 (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding that 
although Congress could not regulate intrastate commerce under the Commerce 
Clause alone, it could regulate intrastate commerce where such regulation was neces-
sary and proper to regulate interstate commerce). 
14
See Thomas More Law Ctr., 2011 WL 2556039, at *14 (describing challengers’ ar-
gument that the individual mandate is unconstitutional “because it regulates inactivi-
ty”); Florida v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., No. 10-00091, 2011 WL 285683, at 
*23 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (concluding that “‘activity’ is an indispensable part” of 
the analysis of Congress’s Commerce Clause power).  
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ment is a government of limited powers.  However, as Professor Hall 
explains, the Supreme Court has generally abandoned the use of for-
mal distinctions like activity versus inactivity to cabin the Commerce 
Clause power.15  Rather, the Court takes a largely functional approach 
that looks to the purposes behind the Commerce Clause.  More specifi-
cally, the Court asks whether Congress is regulating a matter of national 
concern like illegal drug distribution, which Congress may do, or 
whether Congress is trying to regulate a matter of local concern, like K-
12 education, which Congress may not do.16  In the case of the individ-
ual mandate, we have the regulation of the health insurance industry, 
and that is a matter of national concern.17
To be sure, the Court has retained one formal distinction—that 
between economic and noneconomic activity.  However, the formal 
distinction between economic and noneconomic activity is closely 
linked to the functional goal of distinguishing between matters that 
relate to regulation of the national economy and those that relate to 
regulation of local concerns. 
 
Even if there is a place for additional formal distinctions in Com-
merce Clause doctrine, the activity-inactivity distinction is not a good 
candidate for the role.  As Professor Hall observes, there is no connec-
tion between the activity-inactivity distinction and the distinction be-
tween national and local concerns.18  Failure to buy health insur-
ance—a kind of inactivity—is a matter of national concern, while the 
violent assault of a woman—a kind of activity—is a matter of local 
concern.19
 
15
 The Supreme Court formerly distinguished between direct and indirect ef-
fects on commerce, between trade and manufacturing, and between goods flowing 
in commerce from those that had left the flow or had not yet entered it.  Hall, supra 
note 1, at 1836. 
  Indeed, the activity-inactivity distinction never has served 
16
Id. at 1838 n.51 (noting examples of local concerns); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
564-68 (same). 
17
See Thomas More Law Ctr., 2011 WL 2556039, at *13 (“As plaintiffs concede, 
Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the interstate mar-
kets in health care delivery and health insurance.”).  But see Florida v. U.S. Dep’t 
Health & Human Servs., Nos. 11-11021, 11-11067, 2011 WL 3519178, at *59 (11th 
Cir. Aug. 12, 2011) (characterizing the regulation of the health insurance industry 
as a matter of traditional state concern). 
18
Hall, supra note 1, at 1837-38 (“Setting tighter boundaries according to action 
versus inaction would have little to do with the federalism concerns underlying the 
granting of commerce power.”). 
19
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000) (observing that there 
is “no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the National 
Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and vin-
dication of its victims”). 
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as a bulwark against an overly expansive Commerce Clause power.  As 
I demonstrate in another piece, the federal government can achieve 
the same results by regulating economic activity as it could achieve by 
regulating economic inactivity.20  For example, instead of simply re-
quiring people to buy broccoli, Congress could require people to buy 
broccoli when they purchase any other foods.21  Purchase mandates 
are a common form of activity-based regulation.  For example, the 
federal government requires people to buy seat belts when they pur-
chase cars22 and V-Chips when they buy television sets.23
One can illustrate the failure of the activity-inactivity distinction in 
another way.  To support their argument, critics cite to potential im-
plications of a power to regulate inactivity.
 
24  In their view, an author-
ity to regulate inactivity would lead to an excessively broad power for 
the federal government.  This is a legitimate concern.  Courts should 
not employ principles that have undesirable consequences.  What, 
then, are the undesirable consequences that might result from a fed-
eral power to regulate inactivity?  The critics invoke absurd hypo-
thetical laws.  For example, Judge Roger Vinson worried that Congress 
might require everyone above a certain income threshold to buy a 
General Motors car to support a company that is subsidized by taxpay-
ers and an industry that is important to the domestic economy.25  Ac-
cording to this hypothetical, the federal government would require 
tens of millions of Americans to purchase a new motor vehicle.26
 
20
See David Orentlicher, Can Congress Make You Buy Broccoli?  And Why It Really 
Doesn’t Matter, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 9, 12 (2011), http://lawweb.usc.edu/ 
why/students/orgs/lawreview/documents/SCalPostscript84_Orentlicher.pdf (“For 
any economic decision that Congress could reach by regulating economic inactivity, 
Congress also could reach that decision by regulating economic activity.”). 
  But 
21
Id. at 12-13.  For people who farm their own food, Congress could require them 
to cultivate broccoli with their other crops.  Id. at 13. 
22
49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2011). 
23
47 U.S.C. § 303(x) (2006).  V-Chips allow parents to block the display of televi-
sion programming with violent, indecent, or sexual content.  V-Chip:  Viewing Television 
Responsibly, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, http://transition.fcc.gov/vchip/ (last visited 
Sep. 1, 2011). 
24
See, e.g., Florida v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., No. 10-00091, 2011 WL 
285683, at *24 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (discussing potential mandates to purchase 
broccoli or General Motors automobiles); Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate, su-
pra note 10, at 27 (statement of Randy E. Barnett] (discussing potential mandates to 
exercise, eat broccoli, or buy a car). 
25
Florida v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., No. 10-00091, 2011 WL 285683, at 
*24 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).  Other hypothetical mandates include a requirement to 
purchase broccoli or an exercise club membership. 
26
There are more than 200 million Americans who are 18 years of age or older.  
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS, available at http://quickfacts. 
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GM only needs to sell two million cars a year to break even,27 and GM 
could not possibly manufacture the number of cars that a GM-
purchase mandate would require.28  When the potential implications 
of a power to regulate inactivity are highly implausible, why should we 
worry about those possibilities?29
II.  EXPANDING PROFESSOR HALL’S ANALYSIS 
 
A.  The Taxing Power 
Professor Hall rightly identifies the Commerce Clause and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause as the strongest sources of authority for 
the individual mandate.  However, he is probably too quick to dis-
miss the taxing power as a source of authority for the individual 
mandate.  Under Article I, Section 8, Congress has the “Power To lay 
and collect Taxes . . . to . . . provide for the . . . general Welfare of 
the United States.”30 And this is a very broad power.  As long as the 
tax serves the general welfare and has a nonexclusive, revenue-
raising purpose, it is valid.31
There are good reasons to view the individual mandate as an ex-
ercise of the taxing power.  Congress placed the mandate in the In-
ternal Revenue Service part of the U.S. Code,
 
32
 
census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (reporting that the U.S. population stands at more 
than 300 million Americans, with more than 75% older than 18).  About 40% of U.S. 
households have a family income of at least $50,000.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTIC-
AL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:  2011, at 452 tbl. 689, available at 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/11s0689.pdf. 
 and people who do 
27
Nick Bunkley, Resurgent G.M. Posts 2010 Profit of $4.7 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 
2011, at B1.  
28
Consider as well how a GM mandate would drive up costs for steel, glass, and 
other components of cars. 
29 Even if Congress wanted to pass a GM mandate, it could do so by requiring people 
to buy GM when voluntarily  engaged in the economic activity of purchasing a car. 
30
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
31
See Brief of Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Defen-
dants-Appellees at 10-11, Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-2388 (6th Cir. June 
29, 2011) (explaining the broad scope of the taxing power).  The tax also must not 
violate any other constitutional provisions, such as the protections included in the Bill 
of Rights.  Id; see also Liberty Univ. Inc. v. Geithner, No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915, at 
*20 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) (Wynn, J., concurring) (arguing that to be constitutional, 
taxes must be “reasonably related to raising revenue; . . . serve the general welfare; and 
. . . not infringe upon any other right”).   
32
See Liberty Univ., No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915, at *19 (Wynn, J., concurring) 
(“The individual mandate exaction in 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b) amends the Internal Reve-
nue Code . . .”); Brian Galle, The Taxing Power, the Affordable Care Act, and the Limits of Con-
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not purchase insurance will have to pay a fee to the IRS equal to 2.5% 
of taxable income above the personal exemption, with a minimum 
payment of $695.33  Instead of describing the 2.5% levy as a penalty for 
the failure to buy insurance, one can readily characterize the 2.5% 
levy as an income tax that will help cover the costs of health care for 
the indigent, with people qualifying for an exemption from the tax if 
they purchase a health insurance policy.34
But what about the fact that the main purpose of the 2.5% levy is 
to persuade people to buy health care coverage, not to raise revenue?  
At one time, the Supreme Court would strike down taxes on the 
ground that they were regulatory rather than revenue-raising in na-
ture.  However, the Court abandoned the distinction between regula-
tory and revenue-raising taxes decades ago.
 
35
 
stitutional Compromise, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 407, 409 (2011), http://yalelawjournal 
.org/2011/4/5/galle.html (arguing that “[i]t takes a particularly obstinate—even hos-
tile—reading of the IRR provision to find that it is not labeled a ‘tax’”). 
  And Congress often uses 
33
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 § 1002, PPACA § 
10106(b), 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(c)(2) (West Supp. 1A 2010).  The minimum payment 
of $695 will be phased in from 2014 to 2016, and the maximum payment will be 
capped at the average national cost of a health insurance policy with “bronze level” 
coverage under the statute.  Id.  
34 Cf. Liberty Univ., No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915, at *17 (Wynn, J., concurring) 
(“To determine whether an exaction constitutes a tax, the Supreme Court has in-
structed us to look not at what an exaction is called but instead at what it does,” (citing 
Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 363 (1941))). 
35
As the Court has explained: 
It is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely be-
cause it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed.  
The principle applies even though the revenue obtained is obviously negligi-
ble, or the revenue purpose of the tax may be secondary.  Nor does a tax sta-
tute necessarily fall because it touches on activities which Congress might not 
otherwise regulate.   
United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950) (internal citations omitted); see also 
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1937) (“[A] tax is not any the less a 
tax because it has a regulatory effect . . . .”); Liberty Univ., No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 
3962915, at *18 (Wynn, J., concurring) (“[B]oth older and newer opinions indicate 
that the revenue-versus-regulatory distinction was short-lived and is now defunct.”). 
 This point disposes of the argument made by some scholars who invoke the dis-
tinction between a revenue-raising tax, which automatically falls under the taxing pow-
er, and a regulatory tax, which requires an independent source of authority.  See, e.g., 
Erik M. Jensen, The Individual Mandate and the Taxing Power, 38 N. KY. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2011) (manuscript at 18-22), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1683462. 
 Relatedly, critics incorrectly argue that the individual mandate does not qualify 
under the taxing power because it would not raise any revenue if it worked perfectly.  
See, e.g., ROBERT A. LEVY, THE CASE AGAINST PRESIDENT OBAMA’S HEALTH CARE 
REFORM:  A PRIMER FOR NONLAWYERS 4 (2011), available at http://www.cato.org/ 
pubs/wtpapers/ObamaHealthCareReform-Levy.pdf.  That is, if everyone subject to the 
ORENTLICHER FINAL UPDATE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2011 10:10 AM 
2011] Constitutional Challenges to the Health Care Mandate 27 
its taxing power to encourage desirable behavior or to discourage un-
desirable behavior.  For example, Congress enacted a mortgage inter-
est deduction to encourage the purchase of homes, and it has passed 
a cigarette tax to discourage smoking.  Accordingly, as mentioned 
above, a tax need only have a nonexclusive revenue-raising purpose. 
Critics of the Taxing Clause argument claim that Congress did not 
employ its taxing power to pass the individual mandate.  Indeed, 
Congress consciously characterized the 2.5% levy as a penalty rather 
than a tax, and Congress also cited the Commerce Clause as the 
source of its authority to enact the mandate.  According to this claim, 
it is not that Congress was unable to use its taxing power to pass the 
individual mandate.  Rather, it is argued, Congress did not in fact ex-
ercise its taxing power to enact the individual mandate.36
Does it matter whether or not Congress characterized the individ-
ual mandate as an exercise of its commerce or taxing power?  In rul-
ing on a recent challenge to the mandate, Judge Gladys Kessler wrote 
that courts will not ignore the language of a statute and substitute dif-
ferent language.
 
37
 
mandate actually purchased insurance, then no levies would be collected.  But that ar-
gument can be made about other taxes that the Court has upheld.  For example, Con-
gress passed a tax on marijuana distribution before it made the sale of marijuana illeg-
al under federal law.  See Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 43 (noting the objectives of the marijuana 
tax); Richard J. Bonnie & Charles H. Whitebread, II, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of 
Knowledge:  An Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. 
REV. 971, 1048, 1083-85 (1970) (explaining the workings of the marijuana statute).  If 
the tax discouraged everyone from selling marijuana, then the government would have 
collected no money from the tax.  Note, however, that taxes on illicit activities can run 
afoul of the privilege against self-incrimination if they have reporting requirements.  See 
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48-61 (1968) (upholding the defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment privilege in a case involving violations of federal wagering tax statutes). 
  Congress called the 2.5% levy a “penalty,” and 
36
Some critics suggest that the 2.5% levy must be viewed as a penalty rather 
than a tax regardless of congressional intent.  See, e.g., Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. 
Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 784-86 (E.D. Va. 2010) (describing the argument 
made by Virginia’s attorney general).  But that argument rests on outdated 
precedent and a misreading of recent precedent.  See infra note 39.  Critics also ar-
gue that the individual mandate would constitute an unconstitutional direct tax, but 
that argument ignores the point that the mandate can be characterized as a 2.5% tax 
on income, with an exemption for those who purchase health care coverage.  See su-
pra text accompanying notes 32-33.  
37
Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 40-41 (D.D.C. 2011) (concluding that Con-
gress intended for the payment to be a punitive measure and not a revenue-raising 
tax); see also Florida v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Nos. 11-11021, 11-11067, 
2011 WL 3519178, at *69 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2011) (“The plain language of the indi-
vidual mandate is clear that the individual mandate is not a tax, but rather, as the sta-
tute itself repeatedly states, a “penalty” . . . .); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-
2388, 2011 WL 2556039, at *18 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring in part 
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courts therefore should not rewrite the statute to say “tax.”  Fidelity to 
the statutory text is important when deciding the reach of the statute.  
For example, we should assume that Congress would not want courts 
to rewrite a 2.5% tax to make it a 3.5% tax.  However, fidelity to statu-
tory language is not important when deciding whether the statute is 
valid.  There is no reason why we should assume that Congress cares 
whether the individual mandate is upheld under the taxing power in-
stead of the Commerce Clause power. 
Indeed, both doctrine and theory suggest that it should not mat-
ter which power Congress invoked to justify the individual mandate.  
The Supreme Court has held that the constitutionality of a law does 
not have to be based only on a power identified by Congress as its 
source of authority.  Rather, a law will be found constitutional if any 
valid source of authority exists.38  Doctrine, then, supports the taxing 
power justification for the individual mandate.39
 
and delivering the opinion of the court in part) (“Words matter, and it is fair to as-
sume that Congress knows the difference between a tax and a penalty . . . .”). 
 
38
See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243-44 n.18 (1983) (“It is in the nature of 
our review of congressional legislation defended on the basis of Congress’s powers un-
der § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment that we be able to discern some legislative pur-
pose or factual predicate that supports the exercise of that power.  That does not 
mean, however, that Congress need anywhere recite the words ‘section 5’ or ‘Four-
teenth Amendment’ or ‘equal protection . . . .’”); Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 
U.S. 138, 144 (1948) (“The question of the constitutionality of action taken by Con-
gress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise.”); see 
also Liberty Univ., No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915, at *17 n.3 (Wynn, J., concurring) 
(“Congress also does not have to invoke the source of authority for its enactments.”). 
39
In at least one case, the Court has found an important distinction between pe-
nalties and taxes.  However, the issue in that case was whether the levy would be 
treated as an excise tax in bankruptcy proceedings, not whether it constituted a consti-
tutionally valid levy.  See United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 
518 U.S. 213, 215 (1996) (“This case presents two questions . . . first, whether the exac-
tion is an ‘excise tax’ for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(E) (1988 ed.), which at the 
time relevant here gave seventh priority to a claim for such a tax . . . .”).  In another 
case involving bankruptcy proceedings, the Court identified a levy as a tax, even 
though the statute described the levy as a penalty.  See United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 
268, 275 (1978) (addressing the failure of an employer to pay to the IRS monies that 
had been collected in the form of withholding taxes from employee wages). 
 Critics of the taxing power argument cite Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 
U.S. 767 (1994), in which the Court looked to the nature of a levy and concluded that 
it was a penalty even though it was labeled a tax.  See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr., 2011 
WL 2556039, at *19-21 (Sutton, J., concurring in part and delivering the opinion of 
the court in part).  In that case, Montana imposed a tax on the possession of illegal 
drugs.  Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 769 (1994).  However, Kurth Ranch stands only for 
the proposition that a tax can become so punitive—in that case it amounted to eight 
times the market value of the drugs—that it can raise double jeopardy concerns.  Id. at 
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Principles of constitutional theory also support the taxing power 
justification.  According to Judge Vinson, upholding the individual 
mandate under the taxing power would compromise the Constitu-
tion’s basic principle of accountability.  Congress and President Ba-
rack Obama characterized the 2.5% levy as a penalty rather than a tax 
because they knew that taxes are unpopular.  It would be wrong, in 
this view, to allow Congress to disguise its motives when enacting a sta-
tute and thereby make it more difficult for the public to hold mem-
bers of Congress responsible for their decisions.40
The accountability concern is relevant when voters do not know 
whom to hold responsible for legislation.  When Congress imposes a 
mandate that state or local government officials must enforce, then 
voters may blame the state or local officials for the mandate.
  If Congress wants 
to employ its politically controversial taxing power, then it must ac-
knowledge that it is doing so.  However, there is no accountability 
problem from the federal government’s decision to change its as-
serted justification for the individual mandate.  Now that Congress and 
the President have acknowledged that they enacted a tax, the public 
can hold them accountable.  Indeed, voters arguably did just that in 
November 2010 when Republicans secured a majority in the House of 
Representatives and reduced the Democratic majority in the Senate 
from 59 to 53.  More importantly, for voters who do not want to pay 
more of their income to the government, it is irrelevant whether they 
will have to pay more in the form of a “penalty” or in the form of a 
“tax.”  Voters are not so easily fooled. 
41  Thus, 
when Congress adopted a national background check for gun pur-
chasers, the Court rejected a temporary provision requiring local law 
enforcement personnel to perform the background checks.42
 
780-83 (observing that among other factors, the tax was “conditioned on the commis-
sion of a crime”).  The individual mandate is not so punitive. 
  Gun 
40
The levy was not termed a tax, in part, to protect President Obama and mem-
bers of Congress from charges that they were abandoning pledges not to raise taxes.  
See Florida v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1142-43 (N.D. 
Fla. 2010) (discussing the argument that because taxes are the most scrutinized exer-
cise of governmental power, the word “penalty” was used instead). 
41
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929-30 (1997) (explaining that where 
states either have to pay for or implement a federal program, the states are “put in the 
position of taking the blame for its burdensomeness and for its defects”); New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) (“[W]here the Federal Government directs the 
States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, 
while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated 
from the electoral ramifications of their decision.”). 
42
Printz, 521 U.S. at 930. 
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buyers who did not like the background check could easily blame the 
local sheriff conducting the check and vote that person out of office.43
To be sure, it is easy to sympathize with Judge Vinson’s desire to 
hold elected officials to their word.  It is troubling when presidents or 
members of Congress say one thing when trying to pass a bill and 
another thing once the bill has passed.  But this is a matter for voters to 
take into account on election day, and not the basis for a constitutional 
decision by judges.  Aside from the First Amendment and separation-of-
powers concerns, if courts were to police political debate, few acts by 
Congress or the president would be immune from challenge.  Recall, 
for example, the testimony on behalf of the Bush Administration by Of-
fice of Management and Budget Director Mitch Daniels that a war 
against Iraq would cost $50 to 60 billion.
  
But voters know exactly who to blame if they do not like the individual 
mandate to purchase health care coverage. 
44  As the price tag has soared 
past $700 billion,45
B.  Political Preferences Clothed as Constitutional Arguments 
 should a court now find the war unconstitutional? 
If the constitutional arguments against the individual mandate are 
weak, then why have they persuaded federal district court judges, and 
why have they resonated with so many members of the public?  Un-
doubtedly, there are strong political reasons at work here.  Many 
Americans did not want Congress to pass the health care legislation.  
If the Supreme Court were to invalidate the individual mandate, then 
it will not matter that Congress could reenact the same mandate by 
expressly invoking its taxing power the second time around.  Demo-
crats no longer hold enough seats in the House and Senate to pass a 
revised individual mandate.  In addition, senior citizens are less sup-
portive of the legislation than younger voters, likely reflecting the fact 
that much of the funding for the statute will come from reductions in 
Medicare spending.46
 
43
Id.  
 
44
Elisabeth Bumiller, White House Cuts Estimate of Cost of War with Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, 
December 31, 2002, at A1. 
45
See Casey B. Mulligan, The Costs of War, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Aug. 25, 
2010, 6:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/25/the-costs-of-war 
(noting that the estimate covers costs from 2003 to 2010). 
46
See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL 7 
(Mar. 2011), available at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/8166-F.pdf (noting 
that over half of seniors disapprove of the law). 
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Still, we are left with the paradox that the public generally likes 
the individual components of the health care law but, overall, has an 
unfavorable view of the law.47
Or, the public mood about the health care law may really reflect 
the public mood about the economy.  As the economy continues to 
struggle, people are displeased with the high rate of unemployment, 
the lack of job security, and the decline in housing prices.  There is 
good reason to think that public anger is being vented in the form of 
opposition to the health care legislation.  In effect, the public may be 
saying to the President and Congress, “Why were you putting so much 
effort into health care reform when we wanted you to put all of your 
effort into economic recovery?”  To put it another way, Congress 
should have been using its Commerce Clause power to improve the 
economy, not to reform the health care system.  In this view, the deci-
sion by Congress to divert the Commerce Clause power to pass an in-
dividual mandate is a metaphor for Congress’s diverting its attention 
away from the economy.  Once the economy recovers, public opposi-
tion to the health care law may well dissipate. 
  If people like most parts of the law, 
then why do they not like the bill as a whole?  Perhaps dissatisfaction 
with some provisions outweighs the approval of the other provisions. 
Even to the extent that public anger reflects direct antipathy to-
ward the individual mandate, the constitutional arguments are unper-
suasive.  As Professor Hall observes, critics of the mandate typically 
view it as too much of an invasion of individual liberty.48  People, it is 
said, should have the right to decide whether they want to purchase 
health insurance.49  But if that is the case, then the argument against 
the individual mandate should be based on principles of due process 
that apply to state and federal governments alike.50
 
47
See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL 4-6 
(Nov. 2010), available at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/8120-F.pdf (illu-
strating that a majority of voters supported five out of the six components that were 
part of the poll). 
  The Commerce 
Clause and taxing power arguments might stop a federal mandate to 
purchase insurance, but they would not block a state mandate, like 
the one that Massachusetts passed in 2006.  Of course, mandate critics 
cannot invoke the Due Process Clause’s right to individual liberty—
48
Hall, supra note 1, at 1838. 
49
Id. 
50
See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-2388, 2011 WL 2556039, at *32 (6th 
Cir. June 29, 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring in part and delivering the opinion of the court 
in part) (discussing the due process considerations of the individual mandate). 
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the Supreme Court abandoned its protection of economic due 
process long ago.51
In the end, the argument against the individual mandate cannot 
be justified in terms of controlling Supreme Court precedent.  To in-
validate the mandate, the Court would have to revive long-abandoned 
constitutional doctrine.
 
52
 
  But there were good reasons for the Court 
to adopt its modern Commerce Clause and taxing power doctrines, 
and those reasons counsel against a decision to invalidate the individ-
ual mandate. 
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51
See Hall, supra note 1, at 1829 (referring to the Court’s repudiation of Lochner 
jurisprudence in the late 1930s). 
52
Or, the Court would have to carve out a special rule for this particular mandate.  
While it would be difficult to justify a special rule under current Court doctrine, it 
would not be the first time that the Court took such a path.  Recall Bush v. Gore and the 
Court’s decision that was designed for one case only.  531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000).  But in 
that case, the Court was at least able to invoke equal protection principles in a way that 
it cannot invoke Commerce Clause principles to strike down the individual mandate. 
